• Backlash to the apparent backtrack on global tobacco control

    Two life experiences brought me to blogging and health policy advocacy over the past decade.

    One has been the nine-year experience helping to care for my brother-in-law Vincent, who experiences intellectual disabilities connected with fragile X syndrome. I’ve written about this here many times.

    The second set of experiences were the events that precipitated the joys and heartaches of this caregiving experience: The harrowing deaths of my wife’s parents Janice and Gregory Perrone. Both were smokers, and both died far too young from lung cancer.

    The Obama administration has accumulated a strong, readily-overlooked record in domestic tobacco control. Tobacco taxes—a key tool to discourage teen smoking and to induce smokers to quit—have been increased. The FDA has tightened regulation of diverse tobacco products. The Affordable Care Act expands access to evidence-based smoking cessation treatment. Overall, the administration’s tobacco control efforts may well save more lives than the expansion of health insurance coverage to millions of the uninsured.

    This strong track record sets a high bar for the Obama administration’s global tobacco control efforts—which makes its apparent retreat in global trade negotiations especially noteworthy. As Julian Pecquet describes at the Hill

    The Obama administration is backing away from plans to protect U.S. tobacco-control measures from legal challenges under a pending Pacific trade deal, earning the wrath of public-health groups.

    The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) last year suggested creating a “safe harbor” that would have it difficult for cigarette companies to undermine domestic anti-smoking efforts under the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Instead, critics say, the USTR has opted for weaker language that simply restates existing international trade policy that recognizes countries’ authority to enact health and safety measures.

    This isn’t the worst thing in the world; nor is it particularly surprising in light of past U.S. trade policies. Lydia DePillis describes the rather shameful history in a nice Wonkblog piece. As she points out, both policymakers and an array of American industries have good reasons and bad to seek narrow public health exceptions to free trade agreements. Once a tobacco precedent is set, fast food could easily come next. There’s little doubt that many nations (including the United States) would seek to use such exceptions to protect domestic firms from foreign competitors.

    Still, the Obama administration’s retreat remains disappointing. I’m glad that a coalition of normally-Obama-friendly public health organizations did their best to clobber the administration over it:

    Previously, USTR in May 2012 had announced it would propose new language to the TPP that would have created a “safe harbor” protecting national tobacco control measures from being challenged under the agreement. USTR stated at the time that the proposal would “explicitly recognize the unique status of tobacco products from a health and regulatory perspective….”

    Instead, USTR is abandoning this proposal and has announced that it will offer language explicitly reaffirming that tobacco control measures are included in a provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that recognizes nations’ authority to enact health and safety measures. This is the first time tobacco would be singled out as being included in the public health exception to the GATT. However, this language is far weaker than USTR’s original proposal, would not cover lawsuits initiated by tobacco companies and would not provide nations that adopt strong tobacco control measures with the protection they need from tobacco industry challenges.

    Mayor Bloomberg, among others, has added to this chorus, too.

    He’s right to be angry, because there’s no more important public health issue in the world. More than 400,000 Americans die every year of tobacco-related causes. Around the world, between five and six million people die from smoking every year. About half of these deaths will occur among adults of working age.

    These huge numbers are almost almost unfathomable. It is as if the combined populations of Chicago and Houston simply disappeared this year. Then San Diego and Seattle were wiped off the map next year, and so on, roughly forever.

    Tobacco misuse remains the leading preventable cause of death and morbidity around the world. Smoking-related deaths are declining in the wealthiest countries, but the situation is much more serious in middle- and low-income countries. The best projections suggest that one billion people may die of smoking-related causes over the next century.

    Rising incomes aggravate the problem.  People have the disposable income to buy cigarettes. The growth of open trade—for so many reasons an incredibly beneficial development—also creates new challenges. It brings cheaper and more-effectively-marketed tobacco products where they have not been sold at the same scale before.

    The United States government has a mixed record in all of this. Our trade representatives have fought to pry open cigarette markets in Asia and elsewhere for American manufacturers. In many cases, American manufacturers were fighting protectionist barriers to reach consumers served by rival firms or by sleepy public monopolies. In other cases, the industry was trying to override regulatory measures of great public health value.

    In both cases, the public health impact of some U.S. government actions was to cause widespread harm. And the problem is more basic than the need to get a few details right. Simply put, trade-liberalizing measures that lower cigarette prices or that induce more vigorous advertising and marketing increase population smoking prevalence, and thus tobacco-related deaths. A growing academic literature underscores this basic point.

    This episode reminds us of something else, too. Open trade is extremely valuable for developing economies, and for the United States. Yet markets don’t always or automatically promote the public good. Some markets–such as the one for cigarettes–cause great harm.

    It’s helpful to start with some moral and practical clarity. As the USTR rightly acknowledges, tobacco is no ordinary product. It causes premature death and serious illness among hundreds of millions of the people who use it.

    This is no ordinary industry, either.  A USTR spokesperson comments: “As we do for other products, we will continue to press for the elimination of tariffs on tobacco, which, by their very nature, discriminate against foreign suppliers.”

    I sympathize with this statement as an abstract matter of trade policy. In an ideal world, every country would implement stringent public health measures applied equally to domestic and foreign firms. In our actual world, I hope our government puts tobacco tariffs on the absolute bottom of the pile. Surely there is some shoelace maker or victim of software piracy more deserving of help.

    The tobacco industry deserves the coolest of civilities, the most stringent of regulations from public authorities. It merits no particular help from our nation’s diplomats and trade representatives, either.

    This episode being a matter of public health, I expect it to fade from the headlines. Politically speaking, it rates about a “1” out of “10” on the Syria/Benghazi/NSA/VMA scale. Still, it’s gratifying to see the Obama administration taking some political heat from its usual allies when it seems to waver on important matters of life and health.

    Some in the administrative might not even mind to see it. As Franklin Roosevelt was once reputed to have said: “I agree with you, I want to do it, now make me do it.” That’s not a bad guide in public health.

    Thanks to Carl Davis from Black Note Tobacco for noting the broken link in this post.

    @haroldpollack

     
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  • Appeal to irrelevant authority

    Just one of many from An Illustrated Book of Bad Arguments, a free eBook (h/t Paul Kelleher):

    bad argument

    @afrakt

     
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  • What unions are upset about isn’t a flaw with Obamacare

    I know Austin highlighted this post by Avik Roy already, but I want to do the same:

    The issue at hand is the way Obamacare affects multi-employer health plans, also known as Taft-Hartley plans. These plans consist of employer-sponsored health insurance that is arranged between a labor union in a particular industry, such as restaurants, and small employers in that sector. Approximately 20 million workers in the United States are covered under such arrangements, including 800,000 of the 1.3 million members of the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, whose leader, Joseph Hansen, signed the letter I described above.

    Workers with employer-sponsored coverage don’t qualify for subsidized coverage on Obamacare’s insurance exchanges. Those subsidies are designed for low-income people who aren’t offered coverage from their employers, and have to shop for insurance on their own. But the labor union leaders want those subsidies to also apply to their members with employer-sponsored coverage, even though they already get those benefits tax-free due to the employer tax exclusion for health insurance.

    There’s nothing in this that I don’t agree with. Period. Taft-Hartley plans get the employer-sponsored health insurance tax deduction. That’s their “subsidy”. The ACA was not designed in order to give such plans another tax break/credit. Avik’s right.

    Not that the unions don’t have a concern:

    “The unions think it will be cheaper for employers to drop out of the Taft-Hartley plans and go on the health exchange,” said Paul Secunda, a labor law professor at Marquette University School of Law. “This puts pressure on the unions who want to keep workers satisfied and make sure they have a reason to belong to the union.”

    Here’s why the unions think that could happen. DeFrehn says 90 percent of the employers in these plans have fewer than 50 workers. While larger employers will face penalties if they don’t offer health insurance, these smaller employers would not. At the end of a union contract, they would be perfectly free under the law to drop coverage and encourage workers to buy through an exchange.

    The exchanges could be an attractive option for another reason. In an exchange, workers with family incomes as high as 400 percent of federal poverty level would be eligible for a subsidy from the federal government.

    I understand this is a worry for the unions. But giving their plans subsidies as well as the tax breaks seems an awful lot like pandering. I’m open to arguments as to why I’m wrong, as always, but in this case I’m not seeing why this was a “flaw” in Obamacare. The crappy status quo of health insurance can’t be used as a tool to keep unions going. As I’ve said before, tons of wonks favor decoupling insurance from employment entirely, which I’m sure the unions would hate as well.

    By the way, I expect the unions to go crazy about the excise tax in the future, too. I’ll be consistent there, as well.

    @aaronecarroll

     
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  • Chart of the day: Uninsured workers overwhelmingly cite cost as reason

    From an ungated EBRI Fast Facts PDF:

    ebri why uninsured

    This chart is particularly interesting in light of news that the Administration is considering extending subsidies to Taft-Hartley plans, which already benefit from the preferential tax treatment of employer-based health insurance. Without passing judgement on the legality, wisdom, or justice of such a move, it would clearly make such plans more affordable. And, per the chart above, affordability of employer-sponsored plans is a significant issue, their tax exclusion notwithstanding.

    More from Avik Roy:

    The issue at hand is the way Obamacare affects multi-employer health plans, also known as Taft-Hartley plans. These plans consist of employer-sponsored health insurance that is arranged between a labor union in a particular industry, such as restaurants, and small employers in that sector. Approximately 20 million workers in the United States are covered under such arrangements, including 800,000 of the 1.3 million members of the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, whose leader, Joseph Hansen, signed the letter I described above.

    Workers with employer-sponsored coverage don’t qualify for subsidized coverage on Obamacare’s insurance exchanges. Those subsidies are designed for low-income people who aren’t offered coverage from the employers, and have to shop for insurance on their own. But the labor union leaders want those subsidies to also apply to their members with employer-sponsored coverage, even though they already get those benefits tax-free due to the employer tax exclusion for health insurance.

    @afrakt

     
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  • What are your questions? On what should I blog?

    Periodically, I ask these questions on Twitter. I thought I’d do it this way today. Fire away.

    @afrakt (via phone)

     
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  • External memory

    I’ve come to learn that the extended mind is a thing. Wikipedia:

    The extended mind is an idea in the field of philosophy of mind [that] holds that the reach of the mind need not end at the boundaries of skin and skull. Tools, instrument and other environmental props can under certain conditions also count as proper parts of our minds.

    The seminal paper by Clark and Chalmers (PDF, ungated) on extended mind was brought to my attention on Twitter. The Wikipedia page has additional references.

    First of all, to me, duh! I’ve thought that cognition could extend beyond the body for decades. Second of all, I’ve been much more actively aware of extended memory in recent years, owing to the internet, but especially to this blog and Twitter. As I’ve written and said before, I use them as memory aids. If I’ve blogged or tweeted it, I can find it again later. I need not remember the details (as if I could), just enough to retrieve it from the index.

    More recently, though, I realized that this is not new. People extended their mind before the internet. They even did and do it without writing tools. We store memories in other people’s minds. Clark and Chalmers couch this in terms of “belief,” but it’s clear “memory” also works.

    What about socially extended cognition? Could my mental states be partly constituted by the states of other thinkers? We see no reason why not, in principle. In an unusually interdependent couple, it is entirely possible that one partner’s beliefs will play the same sort of role for the other as the notebook plays for Otto [a hypothetical Alzheimer’s patient who extends his memory with a notebook]. What is central is a high degree of trust, reliance, and accessibility. In other social relationships these criteria may not be so clearly fulfilled, but they might nevertheless be fulfilled in specific domains. For example, the waiter at my favourite restaurant might act as a repository of my beliefs about my favourite meals (this might even be construed as a case of extended desire). In other cases, one’s beliefs might be embodied in one’s secretary, one’s accountant, or one’s collaborator.

    I know Aaron’s brain houses certain health policy details I could commit to local memory. I know Adrianna’s got the details on Michigan’s Medicaid expansion. Harold knows drug policy and public health. Bill, philosophy and ethics. Kevin and Nick Bagley, health law, natch. My colleague down the hall remembers which paper to cite when employing various econometric techniques. My wife and kids know the names of hundreds of people around town. Of course all these people and others I can reach know so much more. As needed, I can retrieve this information. How much does it matter that it’s not in my own head all the time?

    It’s part of growing up that one recognizes one’s strengths. Everyone’s mind is optimally configured for something. Mine seems to strongly want to index and compress. Sure, I read a lot, listen to a lot of podcasts, and interact with others and, by doing so, pour in a ton of detail. But it mostly doesn’t stick. What sticks more than most is where I heard or read something (an index).* Or, if the information can be more compactly represented by a stylized fact or rule, I might remember that (compression).

    I’m sure I’m not alone in this. I only now recognize that I’ve been active in pursuit of intellectual environments that play to these tendencies. For instance, though I excelled in all subjects, I was drawn to physics and math in school. Why? Compression. A theory or equation is far easier for me to remember than historical details, scenes of a play, or French verb conjugation rules (relatively simple though they may be).

    As I’ve extended my professional network, thanks to this blog, I’ve noticed that I’m effectively storing memories in many more people. They don’t know I’m doing it. In fact, I’m not really doing anything other than learning what their area of expertise is and acquiring access (by email, usually) to their time. (It’s a two-way street. They’re doing the same to me.) I’m not actually putting the memory in their heads. I’m just learning more about what’s already there, or likely to be, and obtaining something like read-access or database-query privileges. This is not new. This is what networking is all about.

    And, in fact, it’s not very memory like. My engagement with other minds is different from my engagement with my own. I didn’t come to myself with information, the way other people come to me with heads filled. I had to do something, experience something, for information to get stored in my head. I don’t have to do anything for information to be in others’ heads. They have to do something. On the other hand, having done stuff in the past, I do come to my present self with a head full of stuff.

    Nevertheless, there are a lot of ways in which “external memory” may not be like “internal memory.” Some are explored in a paper by Michaelian (h/t Twitter again). But, to me, it is not that interesting that external, information-bearing resources are not just like internal memory. What’s interesting is that they can most certainly be used to supplement internal memory. Technology has made doing so much easier. And, I am grateful for it.

    * My index also stores what is of interest to others I know. That’s why I am so frequently emailing people papers and links. As I see things of relevance, I think of them and share. And, why not? I’m just feeding and caring for my extended mind, after all. (Plus, I like these people.)

    @afrakt

     
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  • Blue Shield of California just did something unusual

    Perhaps you’ve heard that Blue Shield of California will stop covering proton beam therapy for prostate cancer. Look here for details.

    By email, Steve Pearson, President of the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review, told me just how unusual a move this is.

    This action by Blue Shield of California is supported by multiple reviews by independent review bodies of the existing (lack of) evidence on proton beam’s comparative effectiveness, but that makes it none the less remarkable.  It is exceedingly rare for health plans to remove coverage for any service that they have previously covered unless there is striking new evidence of safety problems or other unanticipated harms.  And Blue Shield is not saying that they believe proton beam treatment for prostate cancer is ineffective or more harmful than other radiation techniques. Instead, they are saying that proton beam treatment may be just as good as other options, but it will not be covered because it is far more expensive.  Not covering an effective treatment using this “just as good but more expensive” rationale has always been fair game given most private insurers’ contract language, but I’m unaware of any other important example of its having been exercised once a treatment has been covered and used by thousands of patients.  That’s why I’m impressed with the clarity of Blue Shield’s statements today and by what has to be called their courage in drawing a line in the sand over high-cost treatments that lack convincing data of superiority over other options. 

    In principle, one could imagine an alternative policy approach by the insurer: they could have continued covering proton beam therapy but decided to reduce their payments to the same level as the most reasonable competing approach.  It’s not clear whether it was philosophical, strategic, or just practical reasons that led Blue Shield to opt for non-coverage instead.  Medicare is constrained by its statutory language and years of precedent from exercising either policy approach when a treatment turns out to be no better than another less expensive option.  That’s why it’s refreshing to see a health plan willing to look at the available evidence and do something to help control health care costs and, importantly, provide more of an incentive for manufacturers and researchers to do better comparative studies on new treatment options.  Patients, and all of us, will be the ultimate winners.  Maybe proton beam really is better for prostate cancer than other radiation options, but we don’t know.  Patients don’t know; neither do doctors.  The early evidence is not promising.  So why pay more?  Why pay for it at all at this point when there are other state-of-the-art options that seem just as good and are far less expensive?  By their action today, Blue Shield has shown that it is asking the right questions.

      

    @afrakt (via phone)

     
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  • Stand Up! – August 28, 2013

    I am a frequent guest on Stand Up! with Pete Dominick, which airs on Sirius/XM radio, channel 104 from 6-9AM Eastern. It immediately replays on the channel, so those on the West Coast can listen at the same times.

    We talk about raising the tobacco age in NYC, changes to employer-based health insurance, and the ACA in general.

    You can play the audio right here, after the jump…

    @aaronecarroll

    Read the rest of this entry »

     
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  • Chart of the day: Medicare spending growth slowdown

    From recent analysis by Michael Levine and Melinda Buntin of the CBO:

    Mcare spending growth

    Spending growth has fluctuated over the past several decades, but previous declines were typically associated with significant policy changes (see Figure [in which I’ve added the question mark]). For instance, the drop that began in the early 1980s was caused partly by the anticipation and implementation of the inpatient prospective payment system. The sharp drop in the late 1990s was precipitated in part by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which enacted a broad range of changes in payments to providers. But the most recent slowdown in spending, which began in the mid-2000s, cannot be so readily explained by legislated changes in policy. […]

    Annual nominal growth in FFS spending per elderly beneficiary, which on average was very similar to the growth in per-person spending for all Medicare beneficiaries, was 7.1 percent from 2000 to 2005 and 3.8 percent from 2007 to 2010.2 The difference in growth rates between those two periods, 3.2 percentage points (rounded), constitutes the slowdown our study seeks to explain. […]

    To try to identify the causes of that slowdown, we performed a series of descriptive and statistical analyses based on a diverse array of data sources. However, those analyses did not yield an explanation for most of the slowdown in spending growth.

    Fully 75% of the 3.2 percentage point difference between 2000-2005 and 2007-2012 per beneficiary spending growth cannot be explained by payment rate changes, beneficiary demand due to age and health status, Part A only enrollment, prescription drug use, the financial crisis and economic downturn, supplemental coverage.

    Needless to say, this is a big and important mystery.

    @afrakt

     
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  • Singapore’s health system: commentary from the literature

    This post is coauthored by Austin Frakt and Aaron Carroll.

    We have already written many posts about Singapore’s health system (there’s a a tag for that), which is built around medical savings accounts (it’s Medisave program), though encompasses so much more. Unsurprisingly, we’re far from the first to comment on the system. But, contrary to what some have suggested, we’re not just interested in scoring political points. We want to know what data and evidence have to say about Singapore. This post summarizes a few points from some of the relevant literature from peer-reviewed journals.

    Scholarly literature on Singapore’s health system goes back at least as far as the 1995 Health Affairs paper by William Hsiao. (His paper is ungated. Ungated versions of those linked below may also exist. Use Google Scholar.) He described the country’s health spending trajectory just before and after Medisave was introduced. Medisave, you might remember, is the major source of cost-sharing for the people of Singapore:

    The per capita cost of health care in Singapore, in fact, rose faster after the introduction of the Medisave program in 1984 (Exhibit 2 [below]). Health expenditures per capita rose at an average rate of 13 percent per year-2 percent faster than the average before the introduction of Medisave. Part of this accelerated rate of increase was attributable to the upgrading of public hospital facilities but mostly caused by other factors. […]

    In spite of the high average rate of growth in GDP of 10 percent, Singapore’s health expenditures grew faster, rising from 2.5 percent to 3.2 percent of GDP between 1980 and 1993.

    NHE Singapore

    In other words, health care spending increased after the introduction of increased cost-sharing, which is not what most proponents of such changes would expect. These points are repeated in Michael Barr’s “critical inquiry” into Singapore’s medical savings account, published in the Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law (JHPPL) in 2001. But this was not a randomized controlled trial, and causality is, of course, not proven.

    In an accompanying commentary, Mark Pauly responded with two valid points, among others. First, it’s been well established that the more something costs an individual, the less of it they buy. It’s even been established for health care. Cost sharing definitely matters. Second, casual, pre-post examination of time series is uninformative about the effects of an intervention. How would Singapore’s health spending have changed in the absence of the Medisave intervention? We don’t know.

    Compounding the difficulty in judging Medisave from a time series is that it was not the only intervention. It seems to be uncontroversial in Singapore that substantial government involvement (some may call it “intrusion”) in the health care market is necessary for good performance. Hsiao quoted a 1993 Singapore Ministerial Committee on Health Policy white paper, the first few pages of which can be viewed here:

    Market forces alone will not suffice to hold down medical costs to the minimum. The health care system is an example of market failure. The government has to intervene directly to structure and regulate the health system.

    Barr quoted a different passage of the same document justifies rationing, including by government intervention:

    We cannot avoid rationing medical care, implicitly or explicitly. Funding for health care will always be finite. There will always be competing demands for resources, whether the resources come from the State or the individual citizens. Using the latest in medical technology is expensive. Trade-offs among different areas of medical treatments, equipment, training and research are unavoidable.

    Intervene, the government did. In Health Affairs, Thomas Massaro and Yu-Ning Wong described some of the interventions, including control of physician and hospital supply, generous subsidization of hospital care, and hospital revenue caps. They wrote,

    Financing mechanisms alone do not define a health care system. Singapore has a clearly delineated policy that works in its setting. The state actively participates in every aspect of the delivery system, from physician supply to price setting and the establishment of service criteria. This willingness to intervene aggressively in the market (at levels probably unacceptable to most Americans) may be as important as the individual savings mechanism to its success.

    In a JHPPL commentary that accompanied Barr’s paper, Hsiao described other means of cost control.

    MediShield [Singapore’s opt-out, catastrophic health plan] adopted the risk selection practices of private insurance schemes by excluding as enrollees persons aged seventy and older and by not covering some expensive services, such as treatments for congenital abnormalities, mental illness, and HIV/AIDS. [Some of these policies may have changed since the paper’s publication in 2001.]

    Again, however, point granted to Pauly that some restrictions imposed by Singapore’s government are not altogether different from those imposed by commercial plans in the U.S., for better or worse. We take this to mean that there really aren’t all that many ways to control costs in all areas. Ultimately, you have to say “no” in some fashion.

    In another JHPPL commentary, Chris Ham makes what we think is the most important point:

    The broader lesson from Singapore is that health care reform continues to swing back and forth between a belief in market forces and the use of government regulation. In reality, health policy is replete with examples of market failures and government failures as policy makers experiment with different instruments. The variety of health care systems developed around the world indicates that the choice is neither pure markets nor government control but the balance to be struck between the two. And to return to our starting point, where the balance is struck will be shaped by social values and the political choices that follow from them.

    There’s one more challenge in assessing Singapore’s health system, raised by Barr.

    The government is highly secretive about the detailed operation of its system and has not made either the data source or method of its calculations available to anyone outside those in the Civil Service and the government who need to know—not to the public; not to academic researchers.

    This probably explains why, though there is a literature on the Singapore health system, it’s a modestly sized one. It should also cause anyone serious to hesitate before advocating that Singapore’s system, and its results, can be generalized without some concerns.

    By the way, JHPPL also published a letter to the editor by Meng-Kin Lim (we gather this is his homepage) and responses from Michael Barr and William Hsiao. Finally, here’s a paper that compares Shanghai’s experience with medical savings accounts to Singapore’s.

    The bottom line is that Singapore isn’t simply “cost-sharing”, “free market”, “competition”, and a “lack of government involvement”. If you endorse Singapore’s health care system, you’re buying into many things, and some truths, that libertarians and conservatives claim to dislike. We acknowledge that more cost sharing can reduce spending. But if that’s the only thing you endorse, then you’re not talking about Singapore.

     
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