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	<title>Comments on: Who Has Market Power?: Health Insurers vs. Providers</title>
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	<description>Economics, Health Policy, Law, Life: Musings of Curious Minds.</description>
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		<title>By: Austin Frakt</title>
		<link>http://theincidentaleconomist.com/who-has-power-health-insurers-vs-providers/comment-page-1/#comment-637</link>
		<dc:creator>Austin Frakt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2009 15:17:07 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>@Frank Pasquale - Thanks, the URL is http://www.milbank.org/quarterly/8503feat.html . The passage you quote highlights another layer of complexity. One can view the health care sector as not merely a two-sided market (providers  insurers  consumers) but a three-sided one that includes employers as well. Some have gone so far as to call it a four-sided market, throwing in government too. Economic analysis becomes intractable with so many entities and we&#039;re left with anecdotal evidence and stories. It is difficult ground on which to establish anything resembling &quot;truth.&quot;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@Frank Pasquale &#8211; Thanks, the URL is <a href="http://www.milbank.org/quarterly/8503feat.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.milbank.org/quarterly/8503feat.html</a> . The passage you quote highlights another layer of complexity. One can view the health care sector as not merely a two-sided market (providers  insurers  consumers) but a three-sided one that includes employers as well. Some have gone so far as to call it a four-sided market, throwing in government too. Economic analysis becomes intractable with so many entities and we&#8217;re left with anecdotal evidence and stories. It is difficult ground on which to establish anything resembling &#8220;truth.&#8221;</p>
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		<title>By: Frank Pasquale</title>
		<link>http://theincidentaleconomist.com/who-has-power-health-insurers-vs-providers/comment-page-1/#comment-636</link>
		<dc:creator>Frank Pasquale</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2009 14:14:47 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>The articles cited here are a bit dated.  Joe White’s Markets and Medical Care: The United States, 1993–2005, offers a more skeptical take on a market structure evolving toward bilateral monopoly or oligopoly. 
From the URL above: 

&quot;One might wonder why consolidation among insurers did not allow them to resist the providers’ demand for increased payments. The simple answer is that there were two concentrated parts of the market and one fragmented part. The insurers had to choose between fighting a full-pitched battle with the providers or exploiting their own market power vis-à-vis the employers. Raising premiums to employers was a lot easier. In theory, employers could have demanded restrictive networks (at lower prices). But since everyone had agreed that employees did not like restrictive networks, and providers (especially hospitals) were not willing to discount much to get into such networks, there were not many available for purchase. Individual employers could not invent such a product; they could only shop around and find the relatively best deal by customizing other contract terms, such as cost sharing.&quot;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The articles cited here are a bit dated.  Joe White’s Markets and Medical Care: The United States, 1993–2005, offers a more skeptical take on a market structure evolving toward bilateral monopoly or oligopoly.<br />
From the URL above: </p>
<p>&#8220;One might wonder why consolidation among insurers did not allow them to resist the providers’ demand for increased payments. The simple answer is that there were two concentrated parts of the market and one fragmented part. The insurers had to choose between fighting a full-pitched battle with the providers or exploiting their own market power vis-à-vis the employers. Raising premiums to employers was a lot easier. In theory, employers could have demanded restrictive networks (at lower prices). But since everyone had agreed that employees did not like restrictive networks, and providers (especially hospitals) were not willing to discount much to get into such networks, there were not many available for purchase. Individual employers could not invent such a product; they could only shop around and find the relatively best deal by customizing other contract terms, such as cost sharing.&#8221;</p>
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